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Few chapters of American history have been filled with
more importance and had more impact upon this nation politically, socially and morally than has the era of active · ·;
involvement in the land war in vietnam, during the mid 1960•s.
"

. ""

.

.

The war has taken almost ffi=O, 000 Am.e ri can lives, has contributed directly to the political end of one American president
and has plunged the united states into an ordeal of re-examination and interna.l turmoil rarely seen in u. s. history.
As great as the impact of this war has been, it is
remarkable that little is recalled by American citizens or
acknowledged by the government, of its roots in the mid 1950•s.
Little is remembered of the great conferences of 1954-55,
which sought to bring some peace and political order to southeast Asia.

Rarely has the United states government presented

a factual comparison of our massive involvement in south
vietnam and the two legal documents which have done most to
shape southeast Asia in the last twenty years •·
This paper will examine these two documents, The 1954
Geneva Accords and the southeast Asia collective Defense
Treaty, commonly referred to as the s. E. A. T.
as they relate to American policy in Vietnam.

o. Treaty,
Although this

paper will center on these two documents, it will deal in a
less extensive manner with other events, documents and "commitments", which necessarily are intertwined with the two doc-

2

uments already mentioned.
This paper is concerned with the legality not the morality of the involvement of the united states in vietnam and
it is concerned with those events which have a bearing on its
legality as it is related to the two documents.
Before considering the basic subjects of this paper, It
is necessary to review br.iefly the events in. post world war
II Vietnamese history which would form the basis for the conflict still being waged today.
The situation as world war II ended in southeast Asia,
as concerns Vietnam was this.

The Japanese forces which had

ousted the French colonial authorities, had been defeated.
The Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh or Viet Minh,led by Ho Chi Minh
had been set up to combat,

11

French and Japanese Fascism. 111

Basically the Viet Minh was a nationalistic group, it was
however, led and controlled by communist elements.

The

group fought against the Japanese, during the war, probably
in an effort to free their own country more than to aid the
allies.

The French forces left in Vietnam were only the dis-

armed remnants of the :pre-world war IT colonial force.
were unable to resume control of vietnam.

They

At potsdam, in

JUly, 1945, the American, British and soviet leaders made
plans to divide Vietnam at the

sixte e~th

parallel.

British

lnrape r, Theodore, Abuse of power, The Viking press,
New york, 1967 1 p. 18.
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forces were to occupy the southern sector whil.e Chinese
forces under Chiang Kai-s.hek were to occupy the North.
The objective of these two armies were to evacuate all prisonars of war left in Vietnam and to disarm and capture
all remaining Japanese soldiers in that country.

N~

arrange-

ments were made for the restoration of French authority
in Vietnam.

president ·Roosevelt, in the Malta and yalta

talks, had expressed his belief in the desirability of a
trusteeship for Indo China, and his opposition to a restoration of French colonialism in that area. 2
The British and Indian troops in the south. : a:r~a.,.. at \"~the
order of their commander, General Gracey, disarmed the Viet
Minh forces in their zone, in violation of his orders.

His

forces re-armed the French soldiers of that zone and allowed
them to carry out a coup dtetat against the Viet Minh government.

open warfare between the nationalistic Viet Minh

and the British and French forces began.

When the British

pulled out, 50,000 French troops remained in the southern
sector of Vietnam. 3
In the No_rthern re·gion, Chinese forces were hostile to
both the viet Minh and the French.

They dealt with the pop-

~oreign ~elations of the United states, Diplo~atic
papers, The Conferences at Malta and yalta, 1945, p. 770.

3McT'!lrnan, George and · Lewisl Joh:n 1ft!., The united states;·
in Vietnam, Delta printing, 1967, p. 30.
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ulation as severely as had the Japanese.

The Chinese indi-

cated an unwillingness to leave the country after their ·
assignment was completed.

As a result the Viet Minh had to

choose between the Chinese and the French or fight both.
Their hostility towards China proved the greater.
on M·arch 6, 1946, the French agreed to recognize Ho
Chi Minh's,

Democratic Republic of Vietnam, '' as a free

11

state, forming part of the Indo Chinese Federation and the
French union.

The French agreed to grant that state inde-

pendence in five years.
as France, with
of power.

u. s.

The agreement collapsed in months,

weapons, sought to regain its position

A clash between the Viet Minh and prench units

at Haiphong on November 20, 1946, began a series of incidents which resulted in full scale combat in necember of '· ·"
that year.
The United states was, at first, hesitant in backing
the French colonial effort.

The fall of Ch:!.na to the com-

munists in 1949, however, caused the Truman administration
to lean towards the French.
In February of 1950, the u.

u. s. aid to them. increased.

s.

extended formal diplomatic

recognition to the Bao Dai puppet regime in Vietnam.

soon

aid to the French became associated with intervention in
Korea and the Formosa straits in a policy of containment

5

towards China. 4

The French soon were regarded as battle:lmg

communist invasion rather than suppressing a patriotic or
nationalistic movement.

BY 1952, the

u.

s. was providing 1/3
to 1/2 of the cost of the French war effort. 5 In JUly, 1953,

France promised to grant independence to Vietnam.
the

u.

Thus giving

s. and secretary of state Johh poster Dulles a ba.sis

for increasing its support.
In spite of

u. s.

aid, the French position deteriorated.

At the battle of Dien Bien Phu, a major French force faced
defeat.

French Chief of staff paul Ely, informed president

Eisenhower on March 20, 1954, that only massive
vention could stave off a French defeat.

u.

s. inter-

over the advice of

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff, Admiral Radford, Vice
president Nixon and secretary of state Dulles, Eisenhower .
refused to .: act.

6

!

Dien Bien phu fell.

Facing military defeat abroad and domestic crisis at
home, the French sought a solution which would allow them to
save face.

The Geneva Conference provided such an exit.

The Geneva conference was planned by American, Russian,
British and French foreign ministers.

Cambodia, The Viet

4 ibid.' p. 31.
5 op cit., nraper, Abuse of power, p. 26.

~cTurnam and Lewis, The united states in Vietnam,
p. 39.

Min~ !
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Democratic

~epublic

of Vietnam, Bao Daits state of Vietnam,

taos and communist China, also took part.
April 26, to July 21, 1954.

It was held from

Both the French and the Viet

Minh seemed eager to make a settlement.

The newly elected

prime Minister of France, pierre Mendes France, was eager to
extricate French forces from the battlefields.

The Viet Minh,

led by Ho Chi Minh, possibly pressured by Russia and communist China and eager to avoid further casualties, also
seemed willing to compromise.

With a battlefield advantage,

The Viet Minh were in a favorable position.

Both sides made

considerable concessions.
The u. s.ts attitude towards the conference was ambiguous.

With congressional elections near, Eisenhower didn't

want to be charged with losing Indo China in an unfavorable
settlement or with blocking peace hopes.

7

The attitude of

our government seemed to be one of watch and wait.

And,

disassociating himself from the conference, Dulles left
under secretary of state Bedell smith to represent the

u.

s.

The results of the conference were expressed in two
documents; the bilateral Agreement on the cessation of Hostilities in vietnam and the multi-lateral Final Declaration.
These two documents will be explored, as

u. s.

policy towards

Vietnam is considered in their relationship to them.
7/

~.,

p. 44.

7

The bilateral treaty included the following provisions;
a provisional military demarcation line (fixed at the 17th
parallel), "on either side of which the forces of the two
parties shall be regrouped after their withdrawal,a viet
Minh to the North, French union Forces to the south.
imum regrouping period of 300 days.

A max-

Civil administration

was to be handled by the controlling forces in each zone.
General elections were to be held in the summer of 1956.
The treaty banned additional troop ,reinforcements, arms
or the establishment of new military bases.

An international

commission (canada, India and poland) was established to
supervise the execution of the agreements. 8
It is important to point out at this time, that the division of vietnam was only provisional and not in any way
meant to signify the permanent establishment of two saperate states.

Vietnam was still one nation, one half under

the jurisdiction of the French, the other under the Viet Minh.
The Final Declaration of the convention was agreed to
by all the nations present except the representatives of the
united states and the delegates of the Bao nai, state of
Vietnam.

This

declar~tion

endorsed the armistice agreement;

made arrangements for detailed political and administrative
processes; re-enforced the temporary nature of the provisional division line and took notice of the JUly, 1956 date
8 cmd. 9239, Miscellaneous :No. 20 (1954), Her Majestyts
stationery Office, London, 1954.

8

for general .elections.
Although the united states refused to officially
endors'e this Final Declaration, a statement was maae which
implied its reluctant intention to . abide by its provisions.
In regard to the accords, the

u.

s. would,·, "refrain from the

threat or the use of force to disturb them," further it,
"would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of
the af6resaid agreements with grave concern, and as seriously threatening international peace and security. 119
A similar pledge was made by state of

v~etnam

FOreign

Minister Tran van Do on July 21, 1954. 1 0
It is useful, at this point, to quote one provision of
the Bilateral treaty which was endorsed by the Final Declaration; and a provision of that Final Declaration:
"4. The signatories of the present agreemerit and their successors ·in their
func'tion shall be responsible for the
observance and enforcement of the terms
and provisions thereof.nll
"The conference takes note of the .clauses .
in the agreement ori the cessation of hostilities in vietnam to the effect that no
military base under the control of a foreign state may be established in the regrouping zones of the two parties, the latter having the obligation to see that the
zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of any military alliance and shall
9McTurnan and Lewis, The united states in Vietnam.
p. 51.
1 °Fifeld, nussell H., The Diplomacy of southeast Asia,
Harper and Brothers, New york, !959., p. 296.
ilop cit., cmd. 9239, Miscellaneous No. 20
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not be utilized for the resurri.ption of
hostilitier. or in the service of an
aggressive . policy."l2
The latter provision was taken by Ho Chi Minh, as insurance
that elections would come about regardless of how the
French fared in the south.
a compromise

~easure

rt was probably included as

in exchange for the viet Minhts appro-

val of a temporary partition at the 17th parallel.

With

the out . right support of the soviet union and Great Britain
along with the tacit approval of the united states, the viet
Minh were reasonably confident that the terms of the agreement would be adhered to.
When the desperate condition of the French armies in
Vietnam in 1954 is considered, it is remarkable that the
French and her allies left Geneva with as much as they did.
In fact, l. bO;th Dulles and president Eisenhower felt that the

results of the conference were not as bad as had been expected.
However, Dulles still regarded with horror any agreement
which yielded to a communist oriented regime. 13
After setting the stage, and considering briefly the
provisions of the Geneva agreements, we can now look at
u. s. policy towards vietnam in the light of those provisions.
I feel it is safe to .laS s tUTie 1 that however distaste-

13nraper, Abuse of p-ower,, p. 35.
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ful, they had indicated by .their statements at Geneva
and by their lack of active participation in the talks
themselves, that they would not seek to interfere with
their execution.

The accords seem

ba~ically

to be the

resolution of a state of conflict between the French and
the Viet l\finhts Democratic Republic of vietnam, which had,
at one time, received recogniti.on from France.

Thus a

legal basis for peace in Vietnam had been set-up.
A discussion of . forth coming American, actions toward
vietnam and the Geneva accords must begin with an .understanding of the attitude of the American leaders toward the
Vietnam question.

secretary of state Dulles stated, dur ing

the conference, ffAmerican public opinion would never tolerate
the quaranteeing of the subjection of millions of vietnamese
to communist rule.ul4

This statement was typical of the

attitude of many in the. administration.
.
regarded as a part of the

rnt~rnational

The . viet Minh were
...
Cimmunist movement.

This was a period when the "domino theory," was much in
vogue.

According to this theor3 the fall of vietnam to

the communists would cause the rest of Indo China to fall,
then Indonesia and Malaya, fol1<:>wed by the rest of Asia and
the pacific.

This was the era of "brinksmanship,n of con-

frontation between East and west, the Free and the communist
14~rcTurnan

and Lewis, The uni ted states in Vietnam, Po 60.
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world.

Korea, Formosa and Greece were examples of this.

American government was,

evidentl~,

The

set on continuing this

pattern in Vietnam and Indo China.
After the Geneva

conference~

the united states began a

policy, towards Vietnam,which violated the intent if not the
letter of those accords.
This violation took form, principally, in the disregarding, by the united states' of the

tempora~

status of the

17th parallel provis-ional demarcation line.

The united s.tates

began treating the southern zone, The state of Vietnam, as a
separate and sovereign
nation.
.
-

More than a year before Geneva, the United states had
developed a plan for an alliance of free southeast Asian
states.

The primary purr>ose of this

a~liance

halt the communist advance in the area.
impossible to instigate before Geneva.

would be to .·

The plan had been
The Asian nations

were, as a group, hesitant to join in any

alli~~ce

with France,

while a colonial war was in progress in vietnam.
The end of ijostilities in Vietnam, opened the way for
such an alliance.

The southeast Asia collective Defence

Treaty, or s. E. A· T.
1954, at Manila.

o.

pact, was signed on september 8,

The treaty and its implications will be

discussed in more detail later.
The u.

s.,

The signing nations were,

Great Britain, France, Australia, New zealand,

The philippines, pakistan, and Thailand.

Included in the

protocol of that Treaty, but not actually

signin~was

12

cambodia, Laos and the, ''free

. t~rritory und~r

diction of the state of vietnam. ttl5

the juris-

The s·outhern zone of

Vietnam had entered . into an alliance, if not technically,
in tact and purpose.

This was a violation of the Bilat-

eral treaty and of the Final neclaration, which states,
" ••• (the . zones) .sha~l :t;lOt . canst~ tu~e part. of an~ m~li tary
alliance ••• "

The s. E. A. T.

military alliance.

o.

treaty was certainly a

The treaty violated the Geneva accords

in spirit, it implied that the 17th parallel l1ad a political
character and i·t i.gnored the neutrality of the southern
zone.

It signalled the

u.

s.•s intent to underwrite a

separate state in southern vietnam. 16

The s. E. A. T· Q.

pact seems to be part of the United states answer to the
domino theory.

That answer being to draw the line at the

17th parallel in order to prevent further communist expansion.

Dulles said, after Geneva, that
handing
over. half
.
.

of Vietnam to the communists had,

.

19

eliminated the possiib-

ility of a domino effect in . southeast
Asia," by, " saving"
.. . " .
the other half, Laos and cambodia.l?t
151bid., p • . 62.
16~., p. 63.
1 7nraper, Abuse of power, p. 36.

There are indications,

13

in fact, that

s.

E. A· T.

o.

was

ing Indo . China against further

a~med prim~rily

communi~t

advance, more

than to protect the other Asian states. 18
raise the questipn of whether the u.

s.

at defend-

These facts

e~er inte~ddd

to allow the re-unification to take place.

This is

.re-enforced by the anti-subversion provision of the tr ea t y
aimed specifically . towards Vietnam and Indo China.
As s. E. A· T.

o.

indicated a permanent status for

the demarcation line, so did u. s. policy indicate its
recognition af a sovereign state of
Vietnam in the southern
.
.

'

.

.

)

~

originally, after the cease fire, u. s. aid to Vl·etpam

zone.

was .directed through the French union forces there, and not
to the vietnamese themselves.

Gradually
.
. as ..French author-

ities withdrew during the two year

--

.

regro~pment

.

. ,

,

period,

the united states took its place and attempted to build
up a southern state.
on July J 71

~ 19.54,

in the southern zone.

Ngo Dinh Diem formed a government
The Chief of state, Bao nai, made

Diem premier, giving him full goverrnnental power.
leaders came to odds, with Diem finally triumphing.

The two
A

referendum held on october 23, 1955, favored the deposition of Bao nai and his replacement by Diem, the major... ~, l.-

\.

· -~ ,.._:::.-

: ··

'.';:

. • ~}. ~-

'

_;~:. · _•:

.

lBNew york Times, New york, January 22, 1955,

p.l.
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rn

ity was a highly questionable 98.2~.1 9

ltisulrlg struggles

for power, the u. s. refused
to
support
any governm_e11t but
.
.
Diem•s. BY early 1955, the u. s. was playin~ the major
role in training and reorganizing the National Army. Tli:ts

a

9.-gi:l.'iri·: p;J )ears·' Jto

I

J:·KaV.e~ lJe'eh·; an:·

ffift€hnpt''· tO·Olild .as ov ereign state

in violation of the temporary status given it at the Geneva
talks.
congress seemed to go
forgetting about

with the administration in

alon~

In 1954, senator Mike

re~unification.

Mansfield, in speaking of the

so~therll _ zone

(state of Viet-

nam), talked of u. s. Aid creating, ,, ••• over a set period of
time a self sustaining Vietnam free from further direct
reliance on united states assistance.n20
president Eisenhower, in his 1954 letter to Diem,
pledged u. s. economic assistance to the state of Vietnam. 21
Resulting aid to the state of -vietnam was -f :military and
3/4 economic. 22
1 9 :F,~~eld, The Diplomacy of southeast Asia, p. 305o

20Mccarthy, Joseph E., ' Illusion . of power in Vietnam.
Carlton press, New york, 196'7. p. '71.
· 21Ashrilore, Harry s. and · B~ggs, William c., .MiSsion to
Hanoi., G. p. putnam•s
sons, New york, 1961. p. 230.
.
~

'

:"'

,.

'

22Larson, non .,}t•. . , and:r:-Arthur,, vietnam ·and Beyond·
Rule . of Law Research center,. Duke university, Durham, N. C~,
1965.
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It is to be remembered that the Geneva accords
expressly forbid the introduction of, "all kinds of arms
and munitions."
In the summer of 1955, HO Chi Minh attempted 'to open
the promised consultations on the elections of 1956.
refused.

on JUly 16, 1955, Diem stated,

signed .the Geneva Agreements,

1

~We

Diem

have not

we are not bound in any way

by these agreements, signed against the will of the Vietnamese people." 23 Theunited states supported Diem in
this matter.

The u.

s.

position was summed up by Assist-

ant secretary of state, walters. Robertson,on .rune 1, 1956,
"we believein free elections, and we support president
Diem fully in his position that if elections are held, there
.first must be conditions which
preclude intimidation or
'.
coercion of the electorate.« 24 This statement seems especially inappropriate if the conduct and results of the 1955 1
state of Vietnam referendum are considered.
In was :. '~;he r,p:uench>who ,. shoul.d>have
cution of the elections in 1956.

·. guaranteed~

·the. exe-. t

on March 30, 1956, however•

The state of Vietnam and France had reached agreement. on the
timetable for the complete withdrawal of the French Exped23McTurnan and Lewis, The united states i!l Vietnam.,
p. 81.

24

Fifeld, The Diplomacy of southeast Asia •.• p. 302o
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1 tionary corps.

The French Ntili tary Mission itself came to

an end on May 31, 195'1'.

Long before this however the prench

had turned over authority in the southern zone to Diem
backed by the u. s.
The Geneva accords specifically state that the successors to either . the French or The viet M'i nh, were . obligated
25
to carry out the provisions of the Treaty.
As successor,
in authority, to the French, Diem was. . legally
. bound to abide
by the accords or to turn the government back over to the
French.

He took a third course, he disavowed certain sec-

tions of the treaty, as they applied to the state of vietnam.26

or

the three, "'big"' free world . powers, only the

united states supported Diem's actions.

Both France and

Great Britain refused to endorse his actions.
In two years, the united states had moved from a position
of tacit approval for a separate state of vietnam, by arming
it, including it in the s. E. A· T.

o.

Treaty, both in vio-

lation of the Geneva accords and aiding it economically, to
a position of out right recognition of the state, as a sovereign netion, by supporting Diem's refusal to honor the
Geneva elections provisions.
The action of those two years are interesting when they
are compared with statements made later .bY

u.

s. officials

25 cmd. 9239, Miscellaneous.
2

~tcTurnan and Lewis, The united states in Vietnam.

p. 82.
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In his 1966 state of The union message, Lyndon Jognson said,.
nwe stand by the aeneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962."

In

that same speech, Jognson stated:
years ago -vietnam was a peaceful, lf troubled, land. Iti the north was an
independent communist government. In the
south, a people struggled to build a nation
with the friendly help of the united states •
•••• Then ••• North vietnam decided on conquest.27

"Not - to ~~any

u.s. News and world 'Report, reported in April of 1965, that
the u. s.
V1·etn~,

~overnment

was ready to discuss a settlement in

if the communists would agree to respect the 1954

Geneva Agreements, ;,·_;hich they signed, and let south Vietnam
alone. 28 In 1966, Deputy under secretary for political
Affairs, u. Alexis

Jo@;nso~
'

declared z

:~

.

"It is a travesty on the truth to allege that
the present situation ·wa:s bro'l,lght a:b·out by
the failure of the south to carry ·out the 1954
a ceo rds. In fact, it was the North tha. t was
not willing to submit itself to the test of
free elections under international control. 11 29
A state Department White paper in 1961 stated:

"It was the communists calculation that
nationwide ele·c tions s chedtiled in the
accords for 1956 would . turn all of south
Vietnam over to them •••• The· authorities
27Draper, Abuse of power, p. 90.
'
- 2B..
\Jl•'·

I •
'l r - ·::.::~
:fl- ~· :N~w,s .~.an~u.~world

:R eport., April 5, 1965 p. 64.

29nepartment of state Bulletin, April 4, 1966,
p. 530.
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refused to fall into this well laid trap.n 30
Ih 1964, in an address on the campus of syracuse university,
t .'f,tndon Johpson used the unilateral declaration on Geneva,
by the

u.

s., in 1954,

vention 1; 1::n:; Vietnam.

as ~ a

justificatio~

He accused, in fact 1 North vietnam
•

of

vic::>~ating

for our inter-

tll.e . ac_c ords first.

r•

•

•

He did the same in anothet-

section of that same speech:
"In 1954 1 that Government (North Vietnam)
pledged - th~t l~ would, "~esp~6t th~ territory under the military control of the
other party and engage in no hostile acts
against the other party. tt31
There is, in

fa~t,

<~ .t:.. \_, · ::

little indication
that the
North
..
.

Vietnamese had violated this provision s.ubstantially until
well after the election date, summer 1956, had passed.
secretary of state William ·Rogers stated, on M·a rch 27 1
1969:
"Basically, and as essential elements in an
ultimate settlement, w~ envisage:
Restoration of the provisional military
demarcation line at the 17th parallel, with
reunification to be resolved in the future by
the free decision of the · peo~le of North
Vietman and south vietnam."3
· 30nepartment of state publication 7308 1 released
December, 1961.
3 1New york Times, New york, August _6, 1964 1 p. 7.
32Hearings before committee on Foreign Relations
united states senate, Til'i nety-first congress, first session,
March 27, 1969, y4 •. f76/2:R63.
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ference in JUne of 1964, he stated:

·" tn the case of Vietnam, our commitment

today 'is just the same as the commitment made by president Eisenhower to
president Diem · ln 1954, a commitment to
help these people help themselves."36

Finally, in 1965, the president said, "Ten·

y~ars

ago we

pledged our help.
pledge.

Three presidents have supported that
we will not break it." 37 At Jdhns Hopkins univ-

ersity, Johnson stated, "we are there because we have a
promise to keep.

since 1954 every

Ameri~an pr~sident

has

offered support to the people of south Vietnam.n 38
What was this

1
'

commitment," of the Eisenhower letter.

The letter, made no mention of military aid, it was a conditional offer of economic assistance:
"we have been exploring ways and means 'to
permit our aid to vietnam to be more effective •••• ! am accordingly, instructing -the
American ambassador to Vietnam to examine
with you ••• how · an intelligent program of
American aid •••• can serve to assist Vietnam •••• rt hopes that such aid, combined with
.y our own continuing efforts' will contribute effectively toward an independent vietnam, endowed with a strong government.n39
36nepartment of state Bulletin, JUne 22, 1964 •
. 3'7L!irson, Vietnam and B6yon~. 1 state of the Union
Message.
38N"ew york ·Times, New york, "Lyndon Jol:lnson at Johhs
Hopkins trniversity,tt
39 Larso.n, Vietnam and :Beyond, p. 100.
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Although s.ome

milit~ry

aid, arms and munitions, fol-

lowed the letter, there . is no mention _of any type of military commitment towards south vietnam.

rn fact, in August

of 1965, former president Eisenhower maintained that the
letter was not· :a ·:cothmitment by the u. s. to military interven.t"a·on~:· :

. '"We were. talking, at that time, not in terms of

military support •••• we were talking about economic aid what
we call foreign aid •••• ·tr 40 This would seem to insubstantiate

s~ggestions

that the Eisenhower letter committed the

u. s. to miiitary intervention.
The Kennedy letter is less often sighted as establishing a commitment.

In that letter Kennedy informed

Diem that the united states, in response to his request,
intended to, "promptly increase our assistance to your (Diem•s)
defense effort." 41 tater statements by Kennedy would seem
to indicate that he too was

unwilling to make a solid com-

mitment, in the form of substantial numbers of men, "••••
they are the ones to win it (the war) or lose it," we could
only send, "our men o_ut there as advisors. u 42
. 4% ~ S. ·News an:d world . Report~, U. S. News and '~Torld Report
Inc., washington D·
August 1'7, 1965, p. 15
4 lnraper, Abuse of power., p. 159.

c.,

42 .
ibid. :·
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With Kennedyts limited military aid to South Vietnam, it is doubtful that his letter can be construed to
I

bind· the

u. s.

to large scale military aid.

It seems doubtful that either letter, Eisenhowerts in
1954 or Kennedyts in 1961 is substantial evidence of a
long lasting legal

u.

co~nitment

s. military

to south

Vietnrun.
The

s.

R. A. T.
.
.

o.

treaty or Southeast Asia Col-

lective Defense Treaty has also been the basis of the
United states• action in Vietnam.
presidents

rt has been used by

and Nixon in justifying our major role
in the Indo China war. 43
JO~nson

In August of 1964, president Johnson, ·:. in· recounting
the

u.

s. commitments in vietnam stated that in september

u. s. Signed the Manila, s. E. A. T· o. pa'ct ,

of 1954, the

recognizing that aggression in south Vietnam would endanger the
peace and safety of other nations and he insisted that the
treaty boufld "l the u. s. to military aid in south vietnam. 44
This paper has already discussed the questionable legal
basis, in relation to .Gez:eva, ?f
the protocol of the s. E. A· T.

~nclud~ng

o.

pact.

43ibid., p. 156.
44 Larson, Vietnam and Beyond, p. 107
,.

south

vie~nam

in

This paper has also
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recounted, briefly the _origin -:>f the

~·-

E. A. _T._ o. treaty.

The treaty, as has been stated, was aimed at correcting
the imbalance between the communist and free natiqns,
created by the French defeat in Indo China.

Its primary

purpose was to prevent _the rest of Indo China from falling to the communists.
The major obligations under the treaty are expressed
in Article IV; sections 1 and 2:
"1. Each party recognizes that agression by
means .of armed attack in the treaty area
against any of the parties or against any
state or territory which the parties by
unanimous consent may here after designate, would endanger its own peace arid
safety, ••• and agrees to meet the common
danger ·under its own constitutional processes."
'" 2. If, in the opinion of any of the parties,·
the inviolability or the integrity of the
territory or the sovereignty or political
independence of any party in the treaty
area~ ••• is threatened in ariy way other than
by ·armed attack or is affected or thre a tened by any fact or situation which might
endanger the peace of the area, the parties
shall consult immediately in order to
agree on the measures which sh~$1 be
taken for the common defenae. 11
These two provisions describe, 1.) Korea type, actual
invasion and 2.) Indo China type, subversion. secretary
of state Dulles described the first type as, "' •••• open
45oraper, Abuse of power., p. 157.
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military aggression by the Chinese communist regime."

The

second he referred to as, "disturbances fermented from communist China.~46

The latter type would fit the Vietnam

conflict, at least in its earlier stages of the early and
mid 1960•s.
It is still unclear, if the accords, in a legal sense
apply to those Brotocol states, south Vietnam, taos and cambodia, as they

~id

not sign the

agreemen~s.

A communique

issued during -the Manila conference in 1955, indicated that
.

..

,}

only the signees would be defended actively, with only assistance, hopefully given, to the protocol area.4~
grounds for the s. E. A· T.

o.

The le~al

treaty to include Indo China

. in the p.potocol is highly questionalble.

AS walter Lipp-

man states, "'This was the first instance of an international
treaty legally interfering in the internal affairs of non
signatory. tt'48
The question remains; Did the s. E. A· T.

o.

treaty

obligate the united states and the other signitories to
take the military action which has been taken?

statements

by several authorities would indicate that it does not.
~6Larson, Vietnam and Beyond., p. 102
47 :New york Titnes, New york, January 22, 195~, p. 1.

48 Mccarthy, :tllusion ·of power in Vietnam, p. 49.
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In testifying before th senate Foreign ·n elat ions committee in November of 1954, Dulles declared:
The treatydoes not attempt tq get into the ' difficult question as to how precisely we act ••••
Article LV, paragraph 2, contemplates that if
the sutuation (of subversion) arl.ses or threatens, · that we ,should co.n sult together immediately in order to agree on measures which
should bEf taken. That · is an obligation for
consulta4~on.
It is not an obli.g ation for
· action."
11

Dulles later stated,, '" if there is a revolutionary movement in Vietnam or in Thailand, we .would consult together
as to what to do about it, •••• But we have no undertaking
to put it down; all we have is an undertaking to consult
together as to what to do about it.u50
The senate Foreign Relations committee, in ratifying
the treaty said:
«Netther obligations (article IV, sections 1 and 2)
is an automatic commitment to warfare by the
-gnited~- states :. tni· an:y5 and·, Ja.ll ·· ci:u·cums tances of
Asian troubles.
The understanding is general bet~een the
administration and congress that, if fighting
broke out, congress would be consul~id before
the united states became involved."
49u .• ·j.s-. ··senate:; .t'J.'.n e . southeas·. t ' Asia ··coll.ecti ve Defense
Treaty, 83rd · eongress, 2nd session, Government Printing ·
Office; 1954.
5'1Huti, B. S~ N., vietnam Divided., Bombay Chronicle
press, Bombay, 1964, p. 4'1,
51New york Ti~, New york, January 22, 1955., p. 1.
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In an editorial on January 13, 1955, The New york Times
stated:
"It (the treaty) is riot automatic in it application. It does, however, pledge tne signatory powers to immediate consultation, ••• and
to take required actions within the limit~
tions of their constitutional processes.• 2
In a debate on the senate .floor, senator George,
Chairman of the Foreign Relations committee, declared, that
the

u.

s. couldn't go to war under the treaty without the

sanction of congress.

senator smith observed that there was

no intention to commit United states ground forces in any
hostilities in the treaty area.
The House ·Republican committee on planning and Research
state'!-, "Article IV of the southeast Asia

C~llective

Defense

Treaty •••• does not commit,in advance, any signatory to use
its armed forces to deal with the aggressor." 53
Henry cabot Lodge, former ambassador to south VietJ;lam, stated in 1965:
•rt is a fact that the actions we a~e taking
in Vietnam is not under the aegis of the trnited
Nations or 4he southeast Asia Treaty organization •••• n5
All of these statements are in harsh contrast to that
52New YorkT·inies., editorial, J.anuarJT ?3, 1955;.IV 12~
53House ·Republican committee on planning and ·Research,
"Vietnam:
some neglected A,apects . of . . the Historical 'R ecord."
..
,.

,.

~

54u~ s. News and Wibrld Repo~t, February 15, 1965, l·'P• 64.
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of secretary of state Dean

~sk,

he was asked by senator J.

w.

on January 28, 1966, when

Fulbright, whether or not the

treaty committed us to action in vietnam, he replied:

'yes

1

Sin, I have no doubt that it does."'
The s. E. A· T·

o. treaty called for consultations,

these meetings did take place, notably on qcto,ber :1, ··~19iG1,
April 8 to 10, 1963 and April 13 and 14, 1964.
proposals were adopted at these meetings.

No concrete

None of the other

signatories have seen fit , to support our action in Vietnam
or significantly act on their own.

since they have not

acknowledged the necessity of action in Vietnam; we would
seem to have little grounds for acting, on our own, under
55
the s. E. A· T· o. ~re~ty.
The s. E. A· T.
defensive pact.

o.

pact was meant to be a multilateral

There seems to be little basis for unilat-

eral action.
MY contention that the

trea~y

committment, rests on two factors.

does not form a legal

1g

It is questionable

whether the inclusion of south Vietnam in its protocol is
valid, in light of the Geneva accords, and 2)
.

'

~o
'

arrangements can be_ found in the treaty-, which
signatory to unilateral action.

specific

bin~

any

This latter view is

supported by statements of John Foster Dulles, the de:si)gner
of the treaty.
55Larson, Vietnam and Beyond., p. 105.
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It is

dif~ic':llt _ te _ 'disce_r.n

regarding s • .E. A. T·

o.

a

c~ear

and Geneva.

Ame~ican

cut

policy

C0ntributing to this

confusion has been the .c hanging line of' the official gove~nment

description of the war•s origin and its history.

A prime example of this ambiguity can be found in the comparison of two documents, The state Department White paper
on Vietnam, issued in 1961 and The White paper on the

s~e

subject released in 1965.
The 1961 version still describes Vietnam as one nation,
''•• .divided ••• one-half provides a safe sanctuary from which
subversion in the other half is directed."
direct aggression is made.

No mention of

The document further states

· that, ,.,The basic pattern of Viet cong activity is not new,
'

of course •••• most of the same methods were used in Malaya,
56
In Greece and in The Philippines. rJ
BY 1965, the position
of the government had changed.

rn the 1965 White paper,

the subversion in the south had changed to aggression,

·"south ~

Vietnam 1 is fighting for its life against a brutal campaign
of terror and armed attack •••• This aggression has been
going on for years •••• "
The White paper f.urther states 1 '<t'The war in Vietnam is
a new kind of war •••• ~ ~ totally new brand of aggression.n
The divided nation had changed into two separate states:
56From Department of state publication, 7308, released
D• cember, 1961.
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-• ••• In vietnam, a communist government has
set out deliberately -to conquer a sovereign people in a neighboring state.n5'7
The

supports its charges of aggression with statistics

.P c,.~r.,:.

on the flow of arms and munitions from the North to the south.
on April 20, 1964, Lyndon

Jo~nson

to respond to the need to' defeat the
(Vietnam),

said, that to fail

com~1nists

in

the ~ area

would reflect on our honor as a nation, (and)
would undermine world-wide confidence in our (cause).• 58
11

our policies in Vietnam during the mid and late 1950's and
the early 1960ts, seems have followed this thinking.

u. s.

The

was determined to stop communist expansion at the

17th parallel.
s. E. A• T.

o.

It did not allow the Geneva accords or
limitations block that objective.

It is

probable that at its inception, our policy was influenced
primarily by the concept of a International communist
Conspiracy.

As Dr. Irving Greenberg testified before the

senate Foreign Relations Committee:
"Even opponents of the war would do well to
recreate the moral climate of the early days
of our intervention •••• There was a phase in
-which we saw communist China as expansionist
and North Vietnam as purely a Chinese satellite. - rn th,i.s phase the fear of another
57 From Department of state publication, '7834, released
February, ~965 •
..... \ ::".,; ' •

•• • ••

~

-·

' . -;-: :>.

.-' ...

58L~rson, Vietnam and Beyond, P• 10'7.
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MUnich and the conviction that we dare
not sell out or be indifferent ••• colored
the judgement of many. But ·when •••• events
and facts and growing knowledge of Vietnam reve.a led the falsity of our assumptions ••• we should have admitted (it) •••
This inability to admit error •••• has
driven us deeper and deeper into the mire.~ 59
It is probable that the legal technicalities of the
two documents, had little influence on American policy,
except where it was useful.

It is hard to say whether the

united states was wrong in this.

cerainly history if full

of violations of trusts and treaties of all types.

cer-

tainly, the communists in Vietnam are not guiltless.
paper has not dealt with Communist

violatio~s

This

of the Geneva ·

wa.-e.

accords.

Therevmany.

certainly their reluctance to make

France carry out the treaty agreements is not to their
credit.

certainly both· s;ides can be

bl~ed -} f.or

not

using diplomacy before it- was too late to alter their re;:s·pective courses of action.
My reaction to the facts, events and statements recounted
in this paper, is not one of blame for our government.
It is one of disappointment.

surely, it is not in the spirit

of our heritage and in keeping with our ideals, that we
p~ayed

so prominent a role in destroying the effectiveness

of the Geneva accords.

It is hardly in keeping with the

concepts · of honesty and national integrity, that we have
59Hearings Before the committee on Foreign Relations,
united states Senate, May 7, 1970., p. 11, Y4 F ~6/2: As 4/12.
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used the

s.

E• A• Te

o.. agreement and other documents as the

basis for our intervention in Vietnam.

The inability of the United states to change its course
of action in the face of changing

circumstances~

is surely

one of the greatest weaknesses in our policies toward vietnam
and Indo China.
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